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Abstract 
In their recent paper, "When are thought experiments poor ones?" (Peijnenburg/Atkinson 
2003), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson present an argument to the conclusion that 
most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are "poor" ones with "disastrous 
consequences" and that they share this property with some (but not all) scientific thought 
experiments. The moral they draw is that the use of thought experiments in science is 
generally more successful than in philosophy (of mind).  
In this comment I shall briefly try to show that Peijnenburg's and Atkinson's view on 
thought experiments as it is presented in Peijnenburg/Atkinson 2003, but also in 
Atkinson/Peijnenburg [forthcoming], and Atkinson 2003, is based on an misleading 
characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of 
physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is 
about, we will arrive at a quite different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments. 
 
I. Peijnenburg's and Atkinson's view on thought experiments 
According to Peijnenburg and Atkinson ('PA', for short) there is a felt unease with many 
philosophical thought experiments. Indeed, during the last twenty years there has been a 
considerable amount of papers and monographs on the matter, whereas most contributions 
were rather critical and suggested either to replace thought experimentation in philosophy 
with other methods, or to set up methodological standards that are to be met by successful 
thought experiments.2  
On the other hand there have been also quite a few defenders in recent years. Frank 
Jackson, David Chalmers, Stephen Yablo, George Bealer, John Perry have argued (on very 
different grounds) that thought experiments are quite useful tools of philosophical research.3  
PA refuse to give a definition of what they take 'thought experiment' to refer to, since 
they do not think that this would be necessary for an account of whether or when a thought 
experiment is a good one. Of course, that is false. The word 'thought experiment' has a rather 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Axel Bühler, Mark Breuer, David Chalmers, Klaus-Jürgen Düsberg, and Marcus Rossberg 
for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.  
2 For an overview see Cohnitz 2003c. 
3 Jackson 1998, Chalmers 2002, Yablo 1993, Bealer 1998, Perry 2002, see also Cohnitz 2003b,c. 
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broad meaning and includes, as Elke Brendel4 and others have pointed out, also imaginary 
cases described in physics textbooks. These thought experiments are usually meant to help 
students of physics understand the implications of certain theories and should be judged in 
relation to how well they accomplish that task. The unrestricted notion also includes thought 
experiments that are not intended to induce justified belief revision in the addressee, but belief 
revision that is achieved by ridiculing a rival theory or by recommending the own (as devices 
of propaganda). These possible uses of thought experiments have special criteria of adequacy, 
most of which will be the subject of empirical psychology or the sociology of science.  
However, as it seems clear from their discussion, PA are interested in a subclass of 
thought experiments only. The subclass they are interested in is what we might call "critical 
thought experiments" or "necessity refuters" or "destructive thought experiments". Such 
thought experiments can be characterized as follows5: 
 
(G1)  It's the aim of a destructive thought experiment to induce justified belief revision in 
the addressee. 
 
(G2)  To achieve this aim, a certain state of affairs is described which is claimed to be 
conceivable. 
 
(G3)  The aim is intended to be achieved without realizing the described state of affairs or 
assuming that the state of affairs really obtains. 
 
(G4)  If T is the belief in the addressee the destructive thought experiment is intended to 
revise, S a statement whose necessity follows from T, E the state of affairs claimed to 
be conceivable and therefore possible, the logical structure of a thought experiment 
can in general be regimented thus: (T→□S), (E→¬S), ◊E ├  ¬T.6  
 
I.1 Atkinsons and Peijnenburg on Philosophy 
PA identify a number of philosophical thought experiments which obey the characterization 
given. The examples discussed are Searle's Chinese Room, Frank Jackson's Mary the color 
scientist, and Chalmers' zombie. All these thought experiments are "poor ones" according to 
PA, for they allegedly satisfy at least one of the following indications for a poor thought 
                                                 
4 Brendel 1999. 
5 (G1)-(G3) are conditions first defined by Ulrich Gähde, in Gähde 2000. For a discussion see Cohnitz 2003c. 
6 This regimentation differs from Atkinson's and Peijnenburg's and follows Cohnitz 2003b. Atkinsons and 
Peijnenburg seem to admit that a regimentation like this is more adequate than theirs. 
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experiment: (i) their "conclusions contradict one another" or (ii) their "conclusions beg the 
question". We will briefly try to explicate what is meant by these two indications. 
 
(i) conclusions contradict one another 
Well, certainly no philosopher of modern analytic philosophy has managed to present an 
argument with two contradicting conclusions. It also seems that "conclusion" – as intended by 
PA – does not refer to the states of affairs necessitated by the target theory T, such that 
"conclusions" would "contradict" if (T→(E→(S∧¬S))). For something like this seems to be 
going on in Galileo's famous Pisa experiment (at least according to the reconstruction given in 
Peijnenburg/Atkinson 2003), from the Aristotelian theory (T) of falling bodies, two mutually 
exclusive predictions follow if applied to the case (E) that a lighter musket shot and a cannon 
ball fall connected with each other by a rod. The Aristotelian theory of falling bodies would 
predict for this case that the compounded system both falls faster and slower than the musket 
shot alone. These are "contradicting conclusions" but not of the kind PA seem to be having in 
mind.  
 What they seem to be having in mind is that confronted with the description of a 
scenario, no clearly shared intuitions are triggered in the audience. If asked whether zombies 
are conceivable, or whether Mary learned something new, part of the audience would agree 
the other disagree, presumably, in accordance with their antecedent convictions. Moreover, 
these thought experiments are said to lead to "disastrous consequences", because both sides 
not only can but do use the same thought experiment to argue for their position. The only 
thing changing is the intuition. Thus the indication is that a thought experiment is a poor one 
if the described scenario does not trigger a uniform intuition in the audience, but intuitions 
that oppose each other exactly concerning the topic at issue. 
 
(ii.) conclusions beg the question 
To speak of "question begging conclusions" in an accusing tone seems to involve a too broad 
notion of "question begging". Isn't it kind of natural for a conclusion to beg the question? 
Conclusions of philosophical arguments are intended to answer philosophical problems, thus 
– of course – they should take some definite stance. "'Physicalism is false' is the conclusion of 
your argument, but whether physicalism is true or false is what is at issue in our discussion, 
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thus you are begging the question." is not a correct application of a question begging-
accusation.7 
 PA had better meant something different. It is not entirely clear from their paper what 
they do mean, but here is a less controversial example that might clarify. Consider the 
following thought experiment by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: 
 
Let us assume that some individual should instantly become the King of China, with the further constraint 
that he would lose all memory concerning his former life just as if he would be born anew. Wouldn't that – 
practically speaking – be indistinguishable from the situation in which the individual would be destroyed 
and a King of China brought into being at the same moment and the same place?  The individual has no 
reason to wish for that. (Leibniz 1686/1996, 145-157) 
 
Thus Leibniz himself suggests that it would amount to a content less incoherent wish if one 
wanted to be the King of China by thereby losing the memory of his own past. Here is the 
same story with a different moral drawn: 
  
Many people wish they were somebody else in the sense that they wish they were in his shoes with his 
body, position, relationships, appearance, memory and character. Perhaps my body is withered, my own 
position and relationships are unsatisfactory, my looks are ugly, my memories give me no joy, and I am 
profoundly dissatisfied with my own character. You on the other hand seem very satisfactory in these 
ways. So I wish I were you (in the above sense). Is the wish coherent? Am I, that is, wishing for the 
existence of a logically possible state of affairs different from the present state? Superficially, yes. 
(Swinburne 1974, 245) 
 
Leibniz and Swinburne seem to have exactly opposite intuitions regarding this case. Which 
intuitions they have seems to be depending on what they believe personal identity to consist 
in. Leibniz seems to have endorsed – at this time of his philosophical career – a reductionistic 
analysis, pretty close to Locke's theory, whereas Swinburne thinks that personal identity is 
something unanalyzable.8 If the intuitions triggered by philosophical thought experiments 
were by and large dependent on what antecedent convictions we have, they could not fulfill 
the critical role described above. They would still be useful, of course, for they could serve to 
illuminate what a theory says, or inform us about which theory we are implicitly holding.9 I 
                                                 
7 Nevertheless, Atkinson and Peijnenburg are talking that way when criticizing the EPR thought experiment: 
Atkinson/Peijnenburg 2003, 317. 
8 Later Leibniz came to hold the same view. See his Nouveaux Essais Sur L'Entendement Humain. For a more 
detailed analysis see Noonan 1983, 57-64. 
9 Some interesting applications are the Personal Identity Game and similar applets in the internet 
(http://www.philosophers.co.uk/games/identity.htm). The user is confronted with imaginary cases and has to 
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think, PA would agree that (given this presentation) the thought experiment above satisfies 
both indications for a "poor" thought experiment. 
Unlike most other critics of philosophical thought experimentation, PA think that also 
some scientific thought experiments are "poor ones". The reason is that even some scientific 
thought experiments seem to have at least one of the indicating properties. Nevertheless, 
scientific thought experiments, even poor ones (as judged by the both indicators), are said to 
have less "disastrous" consequences (and might then turn out to be "very good ones", after 
all). Let's see what that means. 
 
I.2 Atkinson and Peijnenburg on Physics 
The two scientific thought experiments discussed are Newton's Bucket (or Einstein's 
spheroid) and the famous Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen thought experiment against the 
completeness of quantum mechanics.    
 Einstein's spheroid case from 'The Foundation of General Theory of Relativity'10 was – 
according to PA – meant to show that observable effects have to be explained by reference to 
observable facts, not by an invocation of "absolute space". Whereas Newton's thought 
experiment, describing essentially the same case, was intended to prove the existence of 
absolute space. Einstein and Newton thus seem to draw contradictory lessons from one and 
the same thought experiment; the case seems to have indicating property (i.) and probably 
also (ii.). However, we know which account to favor. Einstein's theory is superior to 
Newton's, thus by turning to the theories supporting the contradicting conclusions, we arrive 
at a definite judgment. According to PA this is unlike the situation in philosophy where we 
allegedly have no reason to favor one account over the other: 
 
In philosophy, however, the turn to theories is of little help. How should we decide between, say, the 
theories of Searle and Dennett on understanding, meaning and consciousness? It looks as though, at the 
moment, we have no more than thought experiments here, and these thought experiments leave much to 
be desired. (Peijnenburg/Atkinson 2003, 315) 
 
The second example is EPR. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen designed a thought experiment to 
show that quantum mechanics is incomplete (that there are hidden variables, quantum 
mechanics does not account for). Again there seem to be contradictory conclusions drawn in 
the history of physics. Einstein et al. tied physical reality "to absolutely correct predictions 
                                                                                                                                                        
declare what he would say about these cases. In the end his answers are analyzed and he is informed about 
whether and which theory he implicitly holds or whether his answers were inconsistent.  
10 Einstein 1920. 
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that could be made"11 and thus found quantum mechanics wanting. Bohr et al. tied it "to 
measurements that actually are made"12 and considered quantum mechanics complete: 
 
We have a thought experiment with contradictory conclusions: quantum mechanics is complete versus 
quantum mechanics is not complete, or something exists when you have in fact measured it versus 
something exists when you can infer it in principle. Moreover, the conclusions beg the question, for they 
are embodiments of those intuitions for the sake of which the entire thought experiment was conceived. 
What was at stake at the beginning of the debate was precisely the question what is or is not an element of 
physical reality, and it is inappropriate to present those initial intuitions as final conclusions. 
(Peijnenburg/Atkinson 2003, 317) 
 
Although this thought experiment is by both indicators a poor one, it is considered by 
Atkinsons to be "a very good one"13, for it led to an empirical test, namely the experiments by 
Alain Aspect in 1982. Although the original thought experiment left the situation indecisive, 
we could later turn to experiments which were inspired by the thought experiment. Again 
something that PA don't deem possible in philosophy: 
 
The EPR-experiment has thus been given a testable format, but it is unclear how we ever could put the 
Chinese Room or the Mary experiment to the test. To be sure, both the Chinese Room and the Mary 
experiment can be carried out, ethical considerations aside, but that would not resolve the philosophical 
conundrum. (Peijnenburg/Atkinson 2003, 317) 
 
I.3. Summarizing Atkinson's and Peijnenburg's View 
PA seem to be endorsing the following theses: 
 
(PA1)  There are philosophical thought experiments (e.g., Zombies, Mary the color scientist) 
which trigger contradicting reactions (non-uniform judgments) in the audience which 
are endorsed by both sides of a philosophical dispute as arguments for the respective 
positions. 
(PA2)  There are philosophical thought experiments (e.g., Zombies, Searle's Chinese Room) 
which are question begging. 
(PA3)  Both of the above are true for physics as well (e.g., Newton/Einstein, EPR). 
(PA4)  In philosophy we cannot turn to theories to settle conflicts over thought experiments 
(whereas we can in science). 
                                                 
11 Peijnenburg/Atkinson 2003, 317. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Atkinson 2003, 209. 
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(PA5) In philosophy we cannot turn to crucial experiments (whereas we can in science). 
 
In the following I will throw doubt on all of them. Since it is philosophy which is under attack 
here, I will defend philosophical thought experiments (and thus address (PA1), (PA2), (PA4), 
and (PA5)) in section III. In the next section (II.) I will briefly turn to physics and the thought 
experiments mentioned, to discuss (PA3) and (PA5). 
 
II. The Situation in Physics 
PA claim that physics contains thought experiments that lead to contradicting and question 
begging conclusions. They also claim that in physics such disagreement can be solved by 
turning to crucial experiments. I will argue for the examples discussed by PA that the thought 
experiments in question do not lead to contradicting or question begging conclusions. There is 
disagreement, that is correct, but the disagreement is not based on "different intuitions" about 
what is happening in the counterfactual case considered, but based on conflicting criteria of 
adequacy for what counts as a satisfying explanation. This is fully independent of the method 
of thought experimentation, but a problem that occurs in all cases where we have to chose 
between competing explanations whose difference lies in the invocation of empirically 
indistinguishable theories.  
 
II.1 Buckets and Spheroids 
Newton's bucket experiment was intended to prove the existence of absolute space. First of all 
it is not really clear whether it really should count as a thought experiment. It rather seems to 
be a description of a real experiment that Newton had carried out, or a phenomenon one 
should be acquainted with (for the details of the phenomenon are certainly unlike what 
everybody would expect intuitively): A bucket is hanging from a long cord and turned as long 
as it takes to strongly twist the cord. Then the bucket is filled with water and held at rest. 
Suddenly the bucket is impelled in the opposite direction, while the cord untwists: 
 
[…] the surface of the water will at first be flat, as before the bucket began to move; but after that, the 
bucket by gradually communicating its motion to the water, will make it begin sensibly to resolve, and 
recede little and little from the center, and ascend to the sides of the bucket, forming itself into a concave 
figure (as I have experienced), and the swifter the motion becomes, the higher will the water rise, till at 
last, performing its revolutions in the same times with the vessel, it becomes relatively at rest in it. 
(Newton 1726, 10; translation taken from Toretti 1999, 241) 
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Newton's explanation of the phenomenon is that the water's "endeavour to climb the bucket's 
walls and recede from its axis bears witness to its real rotation in absolute space, for the 
water's surface remained initially unchanged while it rotated only in appearance with respect 
to the adjacent bucket" (Torretti 1999, 241). Mach and Einstein are said to have come to the 
opposite conclusion by reflecting on the same thought experiment. Here is Mach's reading of 
the phenomenon: 
 
Newton's experiment with the rotating water bucket teaches us only that the rotation of water relative to 
the bucket walls does not stir any noticeable centrifugal forces; these are prompted, however, by its 
rotation relative to the mass of the earth and the other celestial bodies. Nobody can say how the 
experiment would turn out, both quantitatively and qualitatively, if the bucket walls became increasingly 
thicker and more massive – eventually several miles thick. (Mach 1883/1988, 256; translation taken from 
Torretti 1999, 241) 
 
The disagreement over the "thought experiment" is what counts as the best explanation of an 
observable phenomenon. Newton's explanation assumes absolute space, whereas for Mach 
this is an unnecessary stipulation. The mass of the earth and the other celestial bodies are 
sufficient to explain the phenomenon as it can be observed on earth! (Thus Mach is critisizing 
Newton's methodology, Newton even seems to violate his own rule of philosophy, not to 
"allow more causes of natural things than are both true and sufficient to explain their 
phenomena" (Torretti 1999, 69). 
 So far there is no clash of intuitions concerning a thought experiment. The 
phenomenon is well known and observable, the discussion is about competing alternative 
explanatory hypotheses which are empirically equivalent.  
There is a thought experiment mentioned in the last sentence of the Mach quote: what 
would happen if the bucket walls were several miles thick? Or, alternatively, what would 
happen if the water bucket would do his turns in an otherwise empty universe? Imagine we 
could observe centrifugal forces at a rotating body in an otherwise empty universe: let's 
imagine only one single planet would exist, wouldn't it be shaped like an ellipsoid if it rotated 
and a sphere if at rest? These imaginary cases would count as thought experiments. The latter 
case is a thought experiment by Carl Neumann (Neumann 1870).14  
Do Mach and Newton disagree about these cases? For all cases Newton would 
certainly predict that the water in the bucket would show qualitatively the same behaviour and 
the lonely planet be thus shaped, for its motion is relative to absolute space. Would Mach, on 
                                                 
14 Mach rejects it as inconclusive in Mach 1883/1988, 300.  
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the other hand, predict the opposite? No, Mach would rather refuse to answer the question. As 
becomes clear from the quote given above, we cannot trust our imagination in these 
counterfactual cases: "Nobody can say how the experiment would turn out, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively, if the bucket walls became increasingly thicker and more massive – 
eventually several miles thick" (my emphasis). Mach can even offer a theory of thought 
experimentation and physical intuition that would justify this move. We will not go into it 
here.15 
Therefore in the discussion between Mach and Newton is no clash of intuitions so far. 
Both agree on what is going on in the water bucket on earth, but disagree about the proper 
explanation of the phenomenon. They would not agree about a hypothetical water bucket or a 
lonely planet in an otherwise empty universe, but not because of conflicting intuitions, but 
because Mach would rather refuse to trust his unreliable intuitions about the case. In the 
counterfactual case, it could indeed come to a clash of intuitions. It seems that Mach was 
aware of this and therefore refused to accept the thought experiment of Carl Neumann. Let us 
now turn to Einstein. 
 Einstein seems to have a similar situation in mind. Two fluid bodies, S1 and S2, of the 
same size are hovering freely in space, rotating with constant angular velocity about the line 
joining the masses (as judged by an observer at rest relatively to the other spheroid, 
respectively). Each spheroid was measured and S1 proved to be a sphere, S2 proved to be an 
ellipsoid of revolution. Einstein argues that the difference in shape can and should be 
explained without postulating absolute space, but by postulating the existence of Galilean 
systems, which are observable.  
This seems to be essentially the same argumentative situation as it was with Mach. 
The difference between Einstein and Newton is not a difference in intuitions concerning the 
details of the case imagined, but the question what would serve as the best explanation for 
such a phenomenon. This is in no way a special problem of thought experimentation, but the 
old problem of how to decide between empirically equivalent competing hypotheses. It is also 
clear that Einstein does not present a thought experiment to prove or refute a theory here, he 
wants to "illustrate" by way of example a feature of classical mechanics and special relativity 
theory.16 
 
II.2 EPR, Bell Inequality and Efficient Detection 
                                                 
15 But see Sorensen 1992 for a discussion. 
16 Einstein 1920, 82. 
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When Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen set up their thought experiment, 
they did not try to refute quantum mechanics, but to criticize a certain interpretation of it, 
mainly the Copenhagen view defended by Niels Bohr, according to which quantum 
mechanics can be considered a complete theory of physical reality. The thought experiment 
was thus supposed to uncover an imperfection of quantum mechanics.  
 What EPR tried to show was that given a certain criterion of physical reality, QM 
allows to deduce the existence of more elements of physical reality than QM seems to account 
for. The criterion (meant as a sufficient condition only) was this: 
 
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to 
unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to 
this physical quantity. (Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen 1935/1983, 138.) 
 
The argument proceeded by postulating a certain experimental setup and showing that QM 
would predict for this setup with certainty the value of two physical quantities P and Q, 
although QM claims the same time that not both quantities have simultaneous physical reality: 
 
One could object to this conclusion on the grounds that our criterion of reality is not sufficiently 
restrictive. Indeed, one would not arrive at our conclusion if one insisted that two or more physical 
quantities can be regarded as simultaneous elements of reality only when they can be simultaneously 
measured or predicted. On this point of view, since either or the other, but not both simultaneously, of 
the quantities P and Q depend upon the process of measurement carried out on the first system, which 
does not disturb the second system in any way. No reasonable definition of reality of P and Q could be 
expected to permit this. (Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen 1935/1983, 141) 
 
What Bohr did in reaction to the thought experiment was to try to find a flaw in the argument 
by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. He didn't thereby invoke an alternative set of intuitions 
about what happens in the experiment, but tried to point out an argumentative mistake in the 
argument, he tried to show that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen fell prey to an ambiguity in 
their notion of  'criterion of reality': 
 
In fact, as we shall see, a criterion of reality like that proposed by [Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen] 
contains – however cautious its formulation may appear – an essential ambiguity when it is applied to 
the actual problems with which we are here concerned. (Bohr 1935, /1983, 145) 
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Whether Bohr succeeded in pointing out a flaw in the argument by EPR is highly 
questionable. The success of his argument might best be explained sociologically.17 But that is 
not the point. Bohr did not have contradicting "intuitions" about what would be happening in 
the case and his reply wasn't based on them. He tried to argue against the EPR conclusion, by 
pointing out what he thought is an ambiguity in the original argument.  
The conflict is in fact not about what happens in the imaginary experiment. EPR and 
Bohr are in agreement about what all measurements will be like if such an experiment could 
be carried out. The conflict is about what counts as a satisfying explanation of such a 
phenomenon. Einstein is again invoking an epistemological principle, which led him to favour 
a hidden-variables theory. This alternative hypothesis is taken to be empirically 
indistinguishable from the Copenhagen interpretation of QM. That this assumption is false 
was the insight of Bell, 30 years later. 
 
So far we have discussed the question of whether or not there are scientific thought 
experiments that trigger contradicting intuitions in the audience and whether or not these 
arguments were question begging. We found in the examples referred to by PA no support for 
any of these claims. We shall now turn to the remaining question of whether an experimentum 
crucis in physics could settle the dispute over a physical thought experiment, (PA5). 
 As PA implicitly admit themselves, this is not the case for all physical thought 
experiments. It seems clear, e.g., for Galileo's Pisa-experiment that an empirical test could not 
have solved the matter the way his thought experiment did.18 But this point is not very 
remarkable, given that PA argue elsewhere that Galileo's Pisa-experiment was a poor one in 
the first place (Atkinson/Peijnenburg forthcoming). Therefore we shall turn to EPR and the 
"crucial experiment" carried out by Aspect in 1982. PA suggest that this crucial experiment 
brought the conflict in physics to a halt, in a way that could not be expected to happen in 
philosophy. The situation in philosophy would continue but shift to being about the correct 
interpretation of the experiment. 
 First of all, Aspect didn't immediately bring EPR to a test. EPR – as PA admit – was 
first "retooled" by David Bohm in the 50ies. This made way for John Bell to formulate his 
famous inequalities in 1964, which in fact lead to a predictable empirical difference between 
certain hidden variables theory and the Copenhagen view. Before that, EPR could not be 
brought to a test, for it was unclear what the empirical difference of both views would amount 
                                                 
17 See also Düsberg 1998. 
18 But see Kühne [manuscript] for a well argued critique of this statement. 
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to. From that point it took another couple of years until Aspect found a way to test the Bell 
inequalities in the early 80ies.  
 The second important point to note about the recent history of physics is that this did 
not close the topic. Since then the Aspect experiments are under discussion, for there are at 
least three loopholes for a "local realist"19: 
 
(i.) the locality or "lightcone" loophole 
The correlations which support the Copenhagen interpretation could result from unknown 
subluminal signals propagating between different regions of the experiment apparatus. (Thus 
the way the apparatus is set up still allows for speed of light, or slower than speed of light 
communication.)20 
 
(ii.) the detection loophole 
Experiments test the Bell inequalities by assuming that they measure a fair sample of the 
particles. However, most experiments have detection efficiencies low enough to allow for the 
possibility that the ensemble of detected events actually measured agrees with the 
Copenhagen interpretation, whereas the entire ensemble (all events together) satisfy the Bell 
inequalities.21  
 
(iii.) the "accidentals" loophole 
This objection is not to Bell tests in particular, but to the experimental procedure adopted in it. 
After the measurement, so called "accidentals" are subtracted from the empirical findings (to 
account for artefacts of the measuring process). After the subtraction, the coincidences are 
analyzed. Some data suggests that without the subtraction the results would not have violated 
the Bell inequalities.22  
 
In a recent physics paper on such loopholes, the author comes to the following conclusion: 
 
So why have EPR experiments been so widely accepted as supporting QT, when there are perfectly 
straightforward local realist possibilities, just a few of which I have introduced in this paper? […] 
                                                 
19 Whether all or any of them are or were real loopholes is or was, of course, subject of discussion. My point is 
not that after Aspect's experiments was room for doubt in the sense that there were objective epistemic 
possibilities open, but there were subjective possibilities left open for some physicists which is clear from the 
discussion.  
20 Weihs et al. 1998, 5039. 
21 Rowe et al. 2001, 791. 
22 Thompson [manuscript]. 
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 The explanation for this phenomenon lies in sociological and psychological factors – confusion caused 
by working with a counterintuitive theory, the pressure to produce results acceptable to peers, the 
conviction that nobody else has yet found fault with QT. One "success" in EPR experiments has led to 
another, but the faults have propagated instead of weeded out. (Thompson [manuscript], 4) 
 
Do not get me wrong, I'm not endorsing any such view. What I tried to show in this section is 
that the situation in physics is not so much unlike philosophy. Even if – after a period of non-
trivial reformulations – a thought experiment can be tested empirically, this doesn't 
necessarily close the discussion in physics. As in philosophy the discussion might continue 
and shift to a discussion about the correct interpretation of the experiment. I would predict 
that the likelihood for this is much higher, if the real experiment refuted the conclusion drawn 
from the thought experiment.23  
 PA might reply this: 'OK, so the difference between physics and philosophy is merely 
quantitative, not qualitative, in this respect. That doesn't really matter. The difference between 
a molehill in my backyard and the Mount Everest is "merely" quantitative too. The important 
point is that in physics most scientists can still by and large agree about the interpretation of 
an experiment or the merits of a background theory, whereas in philosophy there is no way 
towards a consensus.'  
Moreover, my discussion of the examples of physics have so far only established that 
in physics does a clash of intuitions not seem to occur. It might still be that the situation in 
philosophy is worse. Thus in the next section I will show that the difference between 
philosophy and physics when they deal with thought experiments is misconceived, by 
showing how philosophers are trying and succeeding to reach agreement over the issues 
involved. 
  
III. The Situation in Philosophy: Why Zombies are not a Matter of Taste 
Now let's see in some more detail what is going on in the philosophical examples given. For 
simplicity we will concentrate on Frank Jackson's Mary and David Chalmers' zombie. We 
have to begin with a brief recapitulation of what is at issue, respectively:  
 
III.1 Mary and what it is like to see red 
Mary, the colour scientist was raised in a black and white room. She learned everything there 
is to know about the neurophysiological account of what it is like to see red. (Mary is living in 
                                                 
23 I'm assuming that in science no contradicting conclusions are drawn from a thought experiment, thus my 
prediction here is not trivial. I argued for this assumption above. 
 13
a future in which neurophysiology is "complete".) She knows what happens in the brain and 
elsewhere when people see red things, in particular what the specific brain state is people are 
in when they see red things. Now, for the first time she is allowed to leave her prison and sees 
a ripe tomato. She forms a new thought: 'This is what it is like to see red.'  
The intuition triggered is that Mary learned something new that she couldn't know 
from the neurophysiology textbooks she had read in her prison. Although she is an expert 
about colour experiences, there was something not accounted for in her textbooks that she 
now learned. Thus there seem to be facts about colour vision that cannot be explained by 
physicalism. Physicalism claims that everything there is to know about the world (including 
everything there is to know about experiences) is entailed in the complete physical account of 
the world. Mary had access to the complete physical account of experiencing red things, but 
she nevertheless learned something new, thus physicalism is false. 
 Note, that the intuition triggered is that Mary learned something new! The intuition is 
not that physicalism is false. This only follows after adding other assumptions. It is correct 
that some philosophers have challenged the thought experiment on the grounds that it is 
impossible to arrive at a verdict about whether Mary learned something new, because it is 
unclear what it means for neurophysiology to be 'complete'. Since we don't know what a 
completed neurophysiology might look like, we must rely on abstract characterizations, but 
there is a problem: if 'complete' means 'everything there is to know about colour experiences', 
Mary cannot learn anything new by definition. If it means 'everything neurophysiology can 
tell you, i.e. everything there is to know except this kind of new stuff Mary learns' the thought 
experiment is question begging. This line of thought does not criticize the thought experiment 
by relying on contradictory intuitions, however! The worry is that the thought experiment 
cannot show what it is supposed to show for its description is question begging. 
 Other philosophers have challenged the move from 'Mary learns something new about 
colour experiences' to 'There is a fact about colour experiences that was left out by the 
neurophysiological description'. These philosophers try to analyze Mary's new knowledge as 
knowing how rather than knowing that24, or analyze Mary's knowledge as concerning a new 
aspect of a fact that she knew about already in neurophysiological terms25. Again, these 
moves do not rely on different intuitions about the case! The intuition ('Mary learned 
something new.') is shared, what is doubted is what conclusions are to be drawn from it. This 
discussion proceeds by comparing different theories of knowing how and knowing that, as 
well as different theories of the content of propositional attitudes and comparing them in the 
                                                 
24 See Perry 2001 on Lewis/Nemirow (152-159).  
25 Perry 2001, 166. 
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light of independent evidence. Thereby philosophers might again use intuitions in their 
arguments but these intuitions are neither about Mary, nor do they contradict each other. 
Therefore, in the Mary case (PA1) and (PA4) do not apply.  
(PA2), which was the thesis that thought experiments in philosophy are question 
begging, might apply in a way, for it is considered to be a possible flaw of the thought 
experiment by participants of the debate. Thus, if (PA2) should apply, this is considered a 
flaw by the methodological standards of the profession, thus not a general methodological 
problem with thought experimentation in philosophy (it were, if the profession had no such 
internal regulations in their methodological practice). The question of whether or not the 
Mary thought experiment is question begging does not depend on any intuitions, but on 
whether or not the notion of 'completeness' can be explicated independently. This is way 
different from PA's analysis of the case. There is no reason to assume that the discussion 
should be doomed to go "continually round on a merry-ground". 
 
III.2 Zombies and what they tell us about physicalism 
The situation with zombies is similar. Modern physicalists do in general not subscribe to the 
view held by members of the Vienna Circle that every statement about a mental state is 
analytically transformable into a statement about physical states. Modern physicalists are in 
general "a posteriori physicalists"26, i.e. they believe that we found a posteriori mental 
properties to supervene strongly on physical properties (or that mental states are a posteriori 
identical with physical states). If we had to find things a posteriori to be in a certain way, it 
must at least be logically possible that things could have been otherwise. Therefore it is 
generally agreed to be a logical possibility that zombies exist. It is conceivable that an exact 
physical duplicate of our world could lack all consciousness. The question is what follows 
from this shared intuition. 
 Some hold that logical possibilities cannot cut any metaphysical ice. Some think they 
can. Chalmers and Jackson have further developed a semantico-epistemological theory that is 
supposed to explain how conceivings of certain kinds can reveal what is logically possible 
and how what is logically possible is connected to what is metaphysically possible. This is so 
called two-dimensionalism.27 If two-dimensionalism (as presented by Chalmers) is the most 
plausible account of logical and metaphysical possibilities, we should conclude that zombies 
                                                 
26 This is an oversimplification of the issue. It is sufficient to make my point here. Getting more into details 
would only prove that the philosophical landscape and the arguments used are of a richer variety than it is 
suspected by Atkinson and Peijnenburg.  
27 See Chalmers 2002, 2004, Jackson 1998, and Cohnitz 2003a for a discussion. 
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are metaphysically possible. But physicalism was supposed to be a metaphysical thesis that 
holds with metaphysical necessity. If zombies are metaphysically possible, physicalism must 
be false. 
Note, two-dimensionalism is not about physicalism or neo-dualism but a modal 
epistemology that makes certain assumption about semantics! When it is discussed whether 
zombies can prove that physicalism is false, what is discussed is whether a transition from 
logical to metaphysical possibilities can be justified along the lines Chalmers and Jackson 
suggest. Again, the discussion in philosophy is not a mere duel of intuitions, pro-zombie on 
the side of neo-dualists, anti-zombie in the physicalist camp. Philosophers are discussing 
whether the background theories that explain the intuitions (or explain the intuitions away) are 
plausible. These discussions are independent of the target issues (which is physicalism in the 
examples considered). (PA1) and (PA4) do not apply. 
To make sure, some philosophers have argued, that the zombie thought experiment is 
question begging. Again, this is an accusation. It is not the case that a physicalist would use 
the zombie thought experiment to argue for physicalism by claiming he had just the opposing 
intuitions. This is a distorted picture Peijnenburg and Atkinson are suggesting.  
In fact, the argument why the zombie thought experiment is question begging is 
similarly subtle as in the Mary case. In the zombie thought experiment we are asked to 
consider an exact physical duplicate of our world. Let's first assume mental causation, i.e. that 
mental states can cause physical states. Say the mental state (M) I was in when I by mistake 
touched the hot plate yesterday caused the physical event (P) that immediately followed, i.e. 
the moving of my hand from the hot plate. In a physical duplicate world (w2) of our world 
(w1) without any consciousness, (M) is not present. But then what about (P)? (P) should be in 
(w2) – it is a physical event – , although uncaused by (M). How can that be? Did (P) just occur 
uncaused at all? That shouldn't be the case, for (w2) was supposed to be a physical duplicate 
world and in our world (w1) physical events don't just occur. Thus how can (P) be part of a 
physical duplicate world (w2), if that world lacks (M)?  
It seems we have to give up the assumption of mental causation about our world (w1) 
to coherently assume that (P) can be part of (w2) although (M) is no part of it. The description 
of the thought experiment seems to presuppose some kind of epiphenomenalism. If 
physicalism implies the negation of epiphenomenalism, the description of the thought 
experiment might beg the question against the physicalist.28  
                                                 
28 See Perry 2001. It is questionable whether Perry really can show that his objection undermines the argument. 
See also Chalmers forthcoming. 
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Again, if the thought experiment is question begging, then this is noticed within the 
profession. Thus, the professional discussion in philosophy seems to be sufficiently equipped 
with internal correcting mechanisms that will keep it in general from the disastrous 
consequences Peijnenburg and Atkinson foresee. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
As we have seen, philosophy is not a mere battle of intuitions. It nevertheless often appears to 
be, because bats, zombies, teletransporters, and brain transplants are more impressive than 
details about two-dimensional modal logic or theories of propositional attitudes. But these are 
the background-theories we turn to and discuss when a thought experiment threatens to refute 
our cherished theory. They are usually independent of the theory under attack, thus 
philosophy is not in general question begging. If it is, this is detected by philosophers and 
used as an argument (this couldn't work, if it were general practice to use question begging 
thought experiments). Lay persons might not take notice of this and be blinded by the 
outrageous stories philosophers seem to contemplate all day.  
PA have left us with indicators for "poor" thought experiments. But when is a thought 
experiment a good one? The idea of Atkinson was that a thought experiment is a good one if it 
can be turned into a real experiment. What to say about this? 
First of all, whether a thought experiment is a good one then turns out to be a question 
we can never answer in advance.29 When they designed the EPR thought experiment, 
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen couldn't foresee Bohm's reformulation nor Bell's inequalities. 
EPR turned out to be "good" 50 years after it was designed. That is pretty unhelpful for 
methodological considerations. This is also basically the reason why I did not discuss PA's 
unhelpful suggestions how philosophy should "improve". If we knew how to settle 
philosophical problems in every case empirically, we would do so. Fact is that for most of our 
problems we have absolutely no clue in what way they might connect to empirical findings. 
Moreover, Atkinson judges the EPR thought experiment "good" independent of its 
content and target. EPR was designed to refute the Copenhagen interpretation, but the 
empirical test rather corroborated it. But if our criterion for a "good" thought experiment is 
indifferent with respect to the content and target of a thought experiment, then thought 
                                                 
29 Note that in Atkinson's and Peijnenburg's analysis the two indicators are not conclusive. A thought experiment 
with both features, e.g. EPR, which Atkinson and Peijnenburg assume to have "contradicting" as well as 
"question begging" conclusions, can nevertheless be a "very good one" if it can later be turned into a real 
experiment. Thus, whether a thought experiment is a bad one turns out to be something that we never know (it 
might always be that we can turn the inconclusive thought experiment into a conclusive real experiment next 
week).  
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experimentation is methodologically speaking on a par with sports, sex, and good coffee, 
which all might equally be good things to do or to have if they lead to fruitful experimentation 
(50 years later, maybe). They are mere practices and the hope that we can say anything 
methodologically enlightening about them is dim. So what are good thought experiments, 
really? I am happy to tell you elsewhere. 
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